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Legislators and Parties in Authoritarian Systems: Rubber Stamps or Loyal 
Powerhouses? Analysis of Policy Influence in the Russian State Duma 
 
Although by far the largest number of historically recorded political systems has been 
authoritarian, comparative political science literature displays a disproportional interest in 
democratic politics (Haber 2008). Indeed, partly due to the unparalleled personalization of 
Europe’s totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, early literature on authoritarian politics 
assumed that institutions and organizations in authoritarian systems are merely epiphenomena 
that lack independent functions beyond reflecting a leader’s will (Friedrich and Brzezinski 
1956; Germino 1959; Friedrich 1970). However, following the footsteps of new 
institutionalist arguments about the ability of institutions to shape political behavior by 
adjusting the incentive structure in which political actors are embedded (North 1990; Shepsle 
2006), recent literature on authoritarian politics takes formal institutions more seriously 
(Brancati 2014; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). More specifically, institutions adjust the 
incentives that actors face in a political environment which is normally characterized by a 
lack of transparency, a weak rule of law and frequent conspiracy by standardizing collective 
decision-making procedures and appointments (Svolik 2012). Interestingly, scholars have 
concluded that institutions such as parties and legislatures enhance the stability and longevity 
of authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). 
 In spite of recent achievements in the study of authoritarianism, however, a number of 
ambiguities remain unaddressed. For instance, as Schuler and Malesky (2014) suggest, in 
order for an institutionalized and durable ruling coalition to become an effective and self-
sustaining mechanism that reduces incentives among elites to conspire against a leader 
(Magaloni 2008; Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007), institutions must genuinely serve 
the interests of those who might become potential enemies. Literature on authoritarianism 
generally views the raison d’être of institutions from the perspective of a “dictator’s 
dilemma’s” (Wintrobe 1998), but insufficiently emphasizes the incentives and gains of those 
political actors who are targeted by institutional structures. This paper, therefore, contributes 
to this literature by addressing the question to what extent legislators have influence on 
policy-making in authoritarian regimes. It does so by first reviewing scholarly literature on 
the mechanisms behind the distribution of policy-influence between executives, legislatures 
and legislators in democracies. Following recent developments in the study of 
authoritarianism, the institutional structures that shape collective outcomes in democratic 
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legislatures are introduced as a way to understand authoritarian politics. The expectation that 
parliamentary party groups enforce an authoritarian leader’s ruling coalition by providing 
mechanisms for collective action to individual legislators is tested empirically with a number 
of hypotheses, using data from the Russian State Duma. The argument of this paper is that, 
contrary to conventional and much scholarly wisdom, parliaments and parliamentary party 
groups in authoritarian systems are important institutions that empower individual legislators 
in the policy-making process.  
 
Executive-Legislative Relations and Parliamentary Institutions  
Although policy-making is among the primary functions of legislatures (Kreppel 2014), 
comparative literature by no means takes the influence by legislatures and individual 
legislators on policy for granted. Indeed, scholars conclude that there is significant cross-
national variation in the relative strength of legislatures vis-à-vis the executive branch 
(Loewenberg and Patterson 1979, 197-198; Polsby 1975; Blondel 1973; Mezey 1979). 
Although the bulk this comparative literature focuses on the US Congress and legislatures in 
other industrialized Western democracies (Kiewiet et al. 2002, 3-5), there is an increase in 
scholarly interest in the extent to which legislatures and individual legislators are autonomous 
from governments and political parties to shape policy in new democracies (Remington and 
Smith 1995; Pettai and Madise 2007; Kopecký 2001; Kopecký and Spirova 2008; Fish 2006). 
Legislatures in non-democratic regimes are, however, generally viewed as powerless when 
compared to the power of the government (Polsby 1975, 268; Mezey 1979, 47). Scholars on 
authoritarianism emphasize the over-dominant position that authoritarian executives occupy 
in relation to ‘rubber stamp’ parliaments in the policy-making process (Fish 2006; White and 
Kryshtanovskaya 2011; Remington 2006; Case 2006; Ottaway 2003).  
The emphasis that comparative literature puts on the macro-level of executive- 
legislative relations has many advantages – one being that it places the influence of 
parliamentary actors in a broader perspective. It diverts attention away, however, from 
questions about how the behavior of individual legislators in both democracies and 
authoritarian regimes is shaped as either subservient to exogenous institutions (including 
governments and parties) or autonomous to organize collective action (Cox and McCubbins 
2007; Krehbiel 1993; Kreppel 2014). In order to fully understand how and why individual 
legislators vote loyally in favor of government policies or, conversely, how they mobilize 
majorities among colleagues in favor of their own legislative proposals, it seems reasonable to 
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suggest that a shift in focus towards the mechanisms behind collective action of legislators is 
necessary. 
David Olson argues that it is of crucial importance to examine not only the external 
structures in which legislatures are embedded, but also the internal organization, rules and 
procedures of legislatures to obtain a full picture of how behavior within parliaments is 
structured (Olson 1994, 132). Legislators in democracies and authoritarian systems are 
generally organized in political party groups and parliamentary committees (Loewenberg and 
Patterson 1979). Theories of new institutionalism have provided numerous arguments about 
how the collective behavior of individuals is affected by institutions such as committees and 
parties (Müller 2000; Shepsle 2006; Laver and Shepsle 1990; Aldrich 2011; Rohde 1991; 
Krehbiel 1993; Cox and McCubbins 2007; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014). For instance, 
institutions facilitate collective decision making by defining procedures in a way that 
empowers certain individuals over others (e.g. ‘veto-players’ (Tsebelis 2002) or agenda-
setters (Cox and McCubbins 2007)). The transaction costs of decision making are rendered 
much lower when legislators follow standard procedures that are hierarchically structured, 
than when each and every decision entails a new bargaining process (North 1990). By 
embedding legislators in parties and committees that shape the career perspectives of 
legislators, veto-players and agenda-setters within these institutions speed up the process of 
decision-making. It is because of this that scholars usually regard political parties as 
organizations that reduce the influence of individual legislators (Müller 2000; Damgaard 
1995) . 
There is, however, a growing literature which argues that legislators with ‘rank-and-
file status’ in party groups are not as powerless as scholars usually suggest (Bowler et al. 
1999; Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Kitschelt 2000). John Aldrich argues, for instance, that, in 
order to remain authoritative and attractive, institutions must not incentivize individuals to 
detach themselves (Aldrich 2011). Although political parties and parliamentary committees 
distribute power asymmetrically among individual legislators, Saalfeld and Strøm (2014, 389) 
hold that institutionally privileged actors need to attract the commitment of MPs by offering 
support for their political goals (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 115-123). Indeed, submitting 
oneself to the authority of a political party can only be rational if individual members can 
reasonably expect that their own political goals can be achieved through the party (Aldrich 
2011). There is a large body of empirical scholarship on parliamentary parties as ‘long 
coalitions’ in which cabinet ministers and party leaders retain the loyalty from back benchers 
through policy bargains (Aldrich 2011; Andeweg 1992; Kitschelt 2000). This mechanism 
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suggests that, in order for ‘less powerful’ legislators to remain incentivized to be subservient 
to institutionally powerful actors, the powerful must not ignore the individual goals of these 
underprivileged (Laver and Shepsle 1999).  
 
Authoritarianism, Institutions and Parliamentary Parties 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the weakness of authoritarian legislatures and the 
subservience of individual legislators to an authoritarian leader is merely due to the dictator’s 
repression. Similarly, in line with the classical literature on legislatures by Polsby (1975), 
Mezey (1979) and Blondel (1973), early scholars on authoritarian politics have deemed 
legislatures as powerless rubber stamps that obediently and fearfully follow the leader’s will 
(Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956). Imprisonment of opposition leaders, crushing of 
demonstrations and staffing parliaments with loyal political parties seem to suggest, indeed, 
that there is no room for pluralism beyond the will of the authoritarian leadership. There is, 
however, a burgeoning literature on the logic of authoritarian government which suggests that 
authoritarian leaders cannot simply rely on repression of political elites and the population in 
order to stay in office (Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Boix and Svolik 2013; 
Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Brancati 2014). For the purpose of enhancing 
regime durability and survival in office, scholars consider it rational for a leader to create an 
incentive structure that renders loyalty and cooperation self-enforcing and durable by 
investing his supporters with self-interest in the survival of the regime. 
The inability of an authoritarian leader to rule alone produces a principal-agent 
problem – due to its own indispensability, a loyal political elite can use its leverage to become 
the leader’s own most serious competition (Magaloni 2008; Boix and Svolik 2013). In 
addition, because every supporter is induced to display loyalty, a leader is unable to measure 
latent dissent among his supporters (Wintrobe 1998). In an untransparent political 
environment in which conspiracy of powerful allies always looms, it is vital for a leader not to 
create the incentives for his allies to detach themselves from the leader (Magaloni 2008). 
Indeed, sustaining subservience through repression reduces the incentives for elites to 
genuinely support the leadership. For this reason, the leadership must not only repress, but 
set-up an incentive structure that co-opts potential oppositional forces into a ‘long winning 
coalition’ by investing them with a stake in the survival of the regime (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003). Scholars suggest that access to spoils and policy-making are mechanisms through 
which authoritarian leaders generate a self-interest in regime longevity among supporters 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1280). Providing access to spoils and policy-making are 
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different types of incentives, the former assuming that political actors are mostly office-
seeking, whereas the latter suggests that actors have policy-seeking incentives. Although the 
view that political actors in authoritarian systems are selfishly office-seeking is not 
uncommon, this must, however, not be assumed a priori. 
 Some have argued that legislative assemblies in authoritarian regimes constitute arenas 
in which members of a ruler’s winning coalition convene to hammer out their preferred 
policies (Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Schuler and Malesky 
2014).
1
 Indeed, in order for the cooptation mechanism to be a genuine power-sharing 
constellation, Schuler and Malesky (2014) argue that “assembly members must have enough 
leverage to extract concessions through the institution” (2014, 685). By providing an arena in 
which a leader’s supporters may bargain over policy (a privilege they might lack after 
leadership succession), the leader establishes an incentive structure for his ‘long winning 
coalition’ to remain subservient and sincerely loyal to the regime executive (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007; Aldrich 2011). Indeed, as much as discipline in party caucuses in 
democratic legislatures is partly sustained through caucus deliberation, a similar method could 
be used by authoritarian leaders to breed sincere loyalty. 
The resurgent literature on authoritarian politics is increasingly rich with arguments 
how institutions assist authoritarian leaders to solve the principal-agent problems they face in 
the absence of transparency (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Brancati 2014). There is, however, 
a lack of emphasis on the perspective of individual legislators who might use the same 
institutions for other purposes, namely to cope with the dilemma of voicing their own 
demands while displaying their subservience (Schuler and Malesky 2014; Wintrobe 1998). 
The literature on the role that political parties in democratic legislatures play as ‘long 
coalitions’ between leadership and back-benchers (Aldrich 2011; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014) 
provides a starting point for such an analysis. Similar to the role that political party caucuses 
play in democratic legislatures, party caucuses in authoritarian legislatures are expected to 
invest legislators with a stake in the leadership’s longevity by offering a channel for policy 
demands (Brownlee 2007). At the same time, by joining a party that is overtly loyal to the 
regime leadership, legislators guarantee that they go down in the records as loyal supporters. 
Paradoxically, then, the subservience of legislators is rendered sustainable through their 
empowerment in parliamentary party groups.  
                                                          
1
 As policy-making is one of the core functions of legislatures, it seems reasonable to suggest that individual 
legislators have policy-making incentives. Office-seeking political actors seeking (private) spoils are more likely 
to obtain their resources through executive-administrative institutions. 
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The theoretical expectation that parliamentary party groups in authoritarian regimes 
provide mechanisms for policy influence of individual legislators is not to suggest, however, 
that each individual legislator yields an equal degree of influence. Many contemporary 
authoritarian regimes have multi-party systems in which different parties are not unlikely to 
possess a different amount of resources to support the policy goals of their members. Uganda, 
Angola, Cambodia, Congo-Brazzaville, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Algeria and Russia, to name 
just a few, are authoritarian systems with nominally democratic legislatures in which seats are 
distributed among at least two political party groups. Although the logic of cooptation 
outlined above suggests that legislatures in authoritarian systems are generally inclusive to the 
demands of legislators, individual political party groups are expected to be exclusive when it 
comes to the distribution of their resources. In order for a party to avoid free-riding behavior 
among its members, it seems reasonable to expect that support for the policy goals of 
individual legislators by the party caucus is conditional on the support that an individual 
legislator displays for his or her party.  
Based on the previous arguments, a number of hypotheses are suggested for analysis. 
First, because parliamentary party groups are expected to disincentivize free-riding among 
legislators by making support for policy demands conditional on party membership, the first 
hypothesis is that: 
 
H1: Legislators are more likely to receive support for their policy demands from 
legislators who belong to the same political party group than from legislators who 
belong to another group.  
 
Moreover, it follows logically from this expectation that: 
 
H2: Legislators who belong to a parliamentary party group are more likely to receive 
support for their policy demands from other legislators than legislators who don’t 
belong to a party group.  
 
Importantly, support from other legislators is necessary but not sufficient to have influence on 
policy. In order for a legislator to have influence, it is also necessary for him or her to 
mobilize a majority of the legislature in favor of his or her initiatives. An additional 
hypothesis that would be reasonable to suggest, therefore, holds that legislators who belong to 
a political party group that controls a parliamentary majority are more likely to mobilize a 
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majority for policy demands than legislators who belong to party groups that don’t control a 
parliamentary majority. Although at an analytical level certainly distinct from the previous 
hypotheses, however, parliaments in authoritarian regimes are often (although certainly not 
always) dominated by one political party that holds an absolute parliamentary majority. In 
such a case (as is the case in the current Russian case-study), support by one (dominant) party 
is necessary and sufficient for a parliamentary majority. Testing H1 on the policy demands 
and voting patterns of the dominant party, therefore, suffices.  
Although the previous hypotheses imply that coalitions are ‘minimized’ (i.e. support is 
offered selectively to fellow party members), the logic of cooptation suggests that legislators 
must not be permanently excluded from the ‘winning coalition’. It can, therefore, be 
suggested that party groups, to some extent, might support the demands of legislators of other 
parties – although less than those of their own members – to enforce the cooptation 
mechanism. The degree to which other parties are associated with the regime leadership might 
be the condition upon which support from other parties depends. It is not unusual for political 
parties in multi-party authoritarian systems to occupy different positions vis-à-vis the regime 
leadership – in the case of Eurasian authoritarian systems, for instance, distinctions are often 
made between ‘parties of power’, quasi-opposition and semi-opposition (Oversloot and 
Verheul 2006; Sakwa 2012). Given the individual legislator’s concern to go down in the 
records as a loyal supporter, legislators are more likely to vote in favor of the demands of 
legislators who belong to more loyal parties than in favor of those who belong to parties that 
are less loyal to the regime. The third hypothesis is, therefore, that: 
 
H3: Legislators are more likely to receive support for their policy demands from other 
party groups when they belong to a party that is close to the regime leadership than 
legislators who belong to party groups that are more distant from the leadership.  
 
Methodology and Case-Selection  
The measurement of policy influence among legislators in both democratic and authoritarian 
regimes is rendered difficult due to the secrecy of caucus deliberations and the sensitivity of 
political bargains and trade-offs that are made behind closed doors. In spite of this, however, 
many scholars on democratic politics have attempted to measure parliamentary dynamics, 
such as party discipline and voting procedures, by analyzing roll-call votes. (Ágh 1999; Rasch 
1999; Lanfranchi and Lüthi 1999; Carnes and Lupu 2015). Some have used the same 
measurement in an authoritarian context as well (Ostrow 2000; Chandler 2004). There are a 
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few weaknesses, however, of using roll-call votes as measurement. First, the sample that one 
takes from the entire population of legislative proposals by selecting those with open roll-call 
votes is, indeed, unlikely to be representative of the initiatives that are voted upon in 
legislatures in another fashion. In the case of the Swiss National Council, however, 
Lanfranchi and Lüthi note that roll-call votes are often registered for the more salient policy 
initiatives, whereas less important pieces of legislation are not formally voted upon 
(Lanfranchi and Lüthi 1999, 106).
2
 The result of this selection bias is, therefore, more likely 
to be an understatement, rather than an overstatement, of the (significant) influence of 
legislators.  
Secondly, an overstatement of the influence of individual legislators might result from 
what Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz have coined as nondecision-making (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1970). There is an unknown number of legislative proposals initiated by legislators 
that are left of the agenda. Thirdly, although the parliamentary records of roll-call votes 
usually administer who initiates a bill or amendment, one does not observe on whose behalf 
an initiator acts. As a consequence, inferring the influence of legislators by using ‘their’ 
legislative proposals as unit of observation might be problematic. These caveats have negative 
consequences for the internal validity of the conclusions. The advantage of using roll-call 
votes is, however, the fact that it carefully administers who initiates a bill or an amendment 
and, importantly, how the votes of legislators are distributed among different party groups. In 
order to test whether parliamentary voting-patterns follow partisan lines, roll-call votes are 
near to ideal. Measuring the influence of individual legislators through support of their party 
groups by analyzing roll-call votes on legislative proposals is, therefore, used as research 
technique. 
The Russian State Duma is selected as a case of an authoritarian legislature. There are 
a number of reasons why Russia is an appropriate case for analysis. First, Russia is a typical 
case of an authoritarian regime that has a strong legacy of nominally democratic institutions. 
There is a large body of scholarship discussing the effectiveness of Russia’s democratic 
institutions in the 1990s under president Yeltsin (Remington and Smith 1995; Chaisty 2006; 
Gel’man and Golosov 1999; McFaul 2001; Gel’man 2003). There is, however, little doubt 
that Russia’s regime has changed from a weak democratic regime into an (electoral) 
authoritarian regime from Putin’s second presidential term onwards (Evans 2011; Remington 
                                                          
2
 Although it is not unreasonable to suggest that the opposite logic might be more applicable for authoritarian 
politics, the current analysis works under the assumption that politically salient bills are likely to be voted upon 
openly. Given that legislators are expected to be loyal to the executive on salient issues in exchange for influence, 
the government is unlikely to face fierce resistance to its policies when votes are open.  
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2008). As argued before, the formal embeddedness of authoritarian regimes in nominally 
democratic constitutions is a widespread phenomenon among contemporary authoritarian 
regimes  (Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010; Brancati 2014). 
Secondly, in contrast to a number of authoritarian countries with one-party systems, 
the Russian State Duma has seen the institutionalization of a multi-party system (White 2012; 
Sakwa 2012; Oversloot and Verheul 2006). In order to test the expectation that the influence 
of legislators varies across different party caucuses, a multi-party system is necessary. Thirdly, 
since the Russian government has the right to initiate legislation in the State Duma, the risk of 
wrongly attributing influence to legislators by mistakenly assuming that their legislative 
proposals are their own initiatives is reduced. Fourthly, the fact that the State Duma included 
independent deputies until 2007 (White and Kryshtanovskaya 2011) enables testing the 
hypothesis that legislators who belong to a party group have a bigger chance to mobilize 
support from colleagues than independent deputies. Finally, no political party in Russia 
effectively controls the government (Sakwa 2011)
3
, which reduces the understatement of 
influence yielded by individual legislators that might result from legislators who use party 
caucuses to set not only the Duma’s agenda, but also the government’s agenda. 
 
Operationalization and Data Collection  
As authoritarianism consolidated in Russia during the early 2000s, the executive branch 
overtook the legislature in the policy-making process by becoming the dominant source of 
important legislation (Chaisty 2008, 446-450). In order to see, however, to what extent the 
policy demands of individual legislators are absorbed into the policies that are initiated by the 
executive branch and whether political party groups play an important role in this process, a 
large-N sample of amendments to government initiated bills is drawn from the online 
database of the Russian State Duma.
4
 Individual amendments are the main unit of observation 
in the analysis. The independent variables are dichotomous variables that indicate the party 
membership (or institutional affiliation) of the sponsor(s) of an amendment. In the case that an 
amendment is sponsored by more than one legislator, an amendment obtains a 1-score on 
multiple independent variables if the sponsors belong to different parties. The dependent 
variables are the percentages of legislators per parliamentary party group that vote in favor of 
                                                          
3
 The Russian government does include members of the United Russia party. It has, however, been reported 
extensively (Oversloot and Verheul 2006; Hale 2005; Sakwa 2011) that political parties in Russia (and other 
Eurasian dictatorships; Isaacs 2013) are too weak to function as the primary channel through which government 
personnel is recruited. Party membership usually comes after recruitment for government (Bader 2011). 
4
 Accessible at http://vote.duma.gov.ru/  
10 
 
an amendment. To control for the possibility that a legislator receives support not only from 
his or her own party, but also from deputies who don’t belong to his or her party, the 
percentage of deputies who do not belong to the sponsor(s)’ party(s) but who, nevertheless, 
vote in favor of the amendment is included as control variable. In addition to this, the 
literature on the organization of legislators contains numerous arguments about the 
importance of parliamentary committees (Krehbiel 1993). The fact that committees in the 
Russian Duma are traditional focal points of sectoral interests is likely to indicate that 
committees have legislative strength in their respective policy area (Chaisty 2006). To control 
for the influence that members of the responsible committee to which a bill is referred might 
have on the voting results, (non-) correspondence of the sponsors’ committee membership 
with the responsible committee is included as another control variable (Chaisty 2005).  
Because of the bounded nature of the dependent variables, the data are analyzed in a 
number of fractional logit regression models (Ramalho et al. 2011). In addition, occasional 
reference is made to cross-committee variations that were obtained from multilevel linear 
models. The multilevel linear models are, however, not reported because cross-committee 
variations turn out to be generally low, whereas coefficients and significance of predictor 
variables remain similar to the results of the fractional logit models.
5
 Data was collected for a 
grand total of 4364 amendments. The selected amendments stretch across three Duma 
convocations (4
th
: 2003-2007, 5
th
: 2007-2011 and 6
th
: 2011-2016) and amount up to, 
respectively, 976 , 1367 and 2021 observations per convocation. The Duma’s online database 
provides details on the results of the votes upon each amendment.
6
  
The selection of bills from which amendments were picked did not follow a logic of 
random selection. Amendments are most likely to be politically relevant (rendering ‘political 
support’ meaningful) when they are introduced to bills that bear high political salience. For 
this reason, amendments are selected from a number of politically salient bills. As an 
indicator of political salience, a bill must be mentioned in the biannual State Duma’s 
Informational-Analytical Bulletin
7
 as ‘priority bearing and socially significant’.8 Some of the 
                                                          
5
 Linear models are inappropriate when response variables are bounded between zero and one because “predicted 
values from an OLS regression can never be guaranteed to lie in the unit interval” (Papke and Wooldridge 1996, 
619-620; Ramalho et al. 2011). Because no software is available that can specify a fractional logit model with 
mixed effects, however, the fractional models do not take variations across different committees in account. For 
this reason, the fractional logit models have been re-specified as multilevel linear models to analyze the data 
with random intercepts that indicate variations across standing committees. 
6
 The standing committee that has been designated by the Duma Council as the responsible committee 
(otvetstvenny komitet) compiles lists that contain all the amendments to a specific bill. Lists with amendments 
(tablitsy popravok) are available online at http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru  
7
 Informational-Analytical Bulletin available at http://iam.duma.gov.ru/node/1 (available in Russian only). 
8
 A list with selected bills is available upon request. 
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bills from which amendments were selected contained an extremely large number of 
suggested amendments, whilst others contained only a few. In cases where the number of 
amendments greatly exceeded 100, a random selection of 100 amendments has been made.
9
 
To compensate for this underrepresentation, each observation is adjusted by a weight factor, 
which is calculated by dividing the actual number of amendments per bill by the number of 
randomly selected amendments. For details on sponsorship of individual amendments, the 
lists with amendments compiled by the responsible standing committee are consulted.
10
  
 
Data Analysis  
After a period characterized by a highly fragmented and weakly institutionalized party system 
in the 1990s, the pendulum of Russian electoral and parliamentary politics swung back to low 
fragmentation and domination by United Russia (a joint venture between regional elites and 
post-Yeltsinite Kremlin elites) that became the successful ‘party of power’ in the 2000s 
(Gel’man 2008, 914). This process was initiated by the Law on Political Parties (2001), which 
put restrictions on party registration, and was strengthened through the electoral reforms of 
2007 when Russia’s mixed member majoritarian system was replaced by a proportional list 
system (Remington 2008). In addition to the dominant party United Russia, which has held an 
absolute parliamentary majority since 2003, three other parties have managed to become part 
of the newly consolidated party system. Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR), established as right-wing nationalist client (or ‘fake’) opposition by the 
Communist leadership in 1990 to take wind out of the real opposition’s sails, is one of the 
oldest still existing parties in Russia. It is accepted wisdom, however, that the LDPR has 
never seriously opposed any of Russia’s governments. By contrast, the Communist Party of 
the Russian Federation (KPRF), the other oldest still existing party, has been a more serious 
electoral threat to Yeltsin’s liberal reforms throughout the 1990s. Although also against 
Putin’s economically liberal reforms in the early 2000s, however, it has become part of 
Russia’s ‘systemic’ opposition that does not seriously attempt to threaten the president’s 
position (Hutcheson 2013, 918). Finally, A Just Russia (‘Spravedlivaja Rossija’) emerged in 
2006 as a Kremlin-initiated merger between right-wing nationalist Dmitri Rogozin’s 
Motherland (‘Rodina’) and Upper House speaker Sergey Mironov’s Party of Life (‘Partija 
Zhizni’) to spoil economically left-wing votes of Communist supporters, while simultaneously 
balancing United Russia in parliament (Gel’man 2008, 922-923; March 2009). After Putin 
                                                          
9
 A random integer generator was used to determine the set of numbers, under which amendments are listed in 
the lists compiled by responsible committees, which would be selected for analysis.  
10
 See footnote 6. 
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expressed his unequivocal support for United Russia in 2008, however, the party lost its clear 
identity as Kremlin-party. Some of Rodina’s MPs refused to merge into A Just Russia and 
established a new party bloc together with a number of single-member district representatives 
under the Russian acronym RNVS (Rodina-Narodnaja Volja-Sotsialisticheskaja Edinaja 
Partija Rossii). This party bloc disappeared, however, after the following electoral cycle. 
Given the constraints imposed by Putin’s increasingly authoritarian politics, all of the three 
co-opted opposition parties have to some extent become supportive of the president as a 
strategy for their own survival (Gel’man 2008, 924).  
Former-Duma MP of A Just Russia and quasi-opposition figurehead Gennady Gudkov 
argues about party influence on the government that “if anything can be done at all, it can 
only be done through personal meetings and agreements between party leaderships and the 
[president and prime-minister]” (quoted in March 2012, 244), suggesting a complete lack of 
effective institutionalized channels for policy influence by legislators. This view corresponds 
to the heavy constraints that have been put on free electoral competition and parliamentary 
opposition by Vladimir Putin since the early 2000s (Remington 2008; Evans 2011). Indeed, in 
his analysis of partisan influence on policy, covering the period 1994-2004, Paul Chaisty 
argues as well that parties are generally weak institutions to affect government policies 
(Chaisty 2005, 311-313). In addition, Vladimir Gel’man writes that parties, including United 
Russia, have a negligible impact on policy-making (Gel’man 2008, 922; Sakwa 2004). United 
Russia and the systemic opposition are generally believed to be entirely subservient creatures 
that have no other purpose than supporting Putin’s policies through reducing the transaction 
costs of getting bills through the legislature (Chaisty 2005).  
The data collected for the current research, however, seem to suggest the contrary of 
what is generally assumed to be a necessary consequence of the constraints put on sincere 
anti-government opposition in authoritarian regimes, namely that legislators would lack 
influence on the leader’s policy. In fact, the data show that legislators are rather actively 
involved in policy making and that, importantly, political parties seem to be important 
‘institutional vehicles’ which individual legislators use to mobilize support for their demands. 
Admittedly, an important qualification is that most legislative influence rests with legislators 
of Russia’s most loyal regime-supporting party, United Russia. Although not absent, 
influence is significantly lower among deputies of Russia’s three quasi-opposition parties. As 
a general rule, influence is distributed selectively and often exclusively to members of the 
United Russia party.  
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Frequencies and percentages are adjusted by weights calculated by the ratio between the total number of 
amendments per bill and the selected number of amendments (number of observations in the data between 
brackets). Due to co-sponsorship, the frequencies do not add up to the total frequencies. 
Table 1 presents the frequencies by which amendments that legislators introduce to 
government legislation pass a parliamentary majority. Frequencies in all columns are adjusted 
by a weight factor defined as the ratio between the total number of amendments per bill and 
the selected number of amendments. In the sixth Duma convocation (2011-2016), 79,5% of 
the amendments introduced to government bills pass a parliamentary majority. 98,9 of the 
amendments that are sponsored by at least one legislator of United Russia are voted upon 
favorably by a majority of deputies. A similar picture appears from the data on the fourth and 
fifth Duma convocations (2003-2007 and 2007-2011) - respectively, 84,5% and 84,3 of the 
amendments pass a majority. In addition, 95,1% and 97,5%, respectively, of the amendments 
sponsored by one or more United Russia legislators pass. Given that United Russia has held 
an absolute majority throughout the three convocations under analysis, these results seem 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on amendments per sponsor affiliation 
 Frequency Average 
Support by 
own party 
Success 
rate 
Co-sponsored 
amendments 
Co-sponsorship 
with United 
Russia 
6th convocation      
United Russia  1670 (833) 98,5% 98,9% 23,3%  
KPRF 596 (324) 45% 55,4% 43,2% 12,9% 
LDPR 242 (130) 40,4% 82,8% 54,9% 49,1% 
A Just Russia 818 (586) 52,0% 33,6% 25,1% 2,4% 
Government 321 (108)  100% 2,1% 2,1% 
Upper House 449 (193)  96,4% 49,8% 49,8% 
Regional Executives/ 
Federal Courts 
269 (145)  96,6% 7,9% 7,9 
Total 3704 (2021)  79,5% 15,6%  
5th convocation      
United Russia  1438 (609) 96,4% 97,5% 11,3%  
KPRF 504 (257) 64,6% 41,9% 21,1% 15,5% 
LDPR 71 (41) 7,2% 79% 67,7% 67,7% 
A Just Russia 465 (299) 39,8% 66,6% 28,7% 22,5% 
Government 460 (142)  100% 1,7% 1,7% 
Upper House 136 (185)  96,8% 5,9% 5,9% 
Regional Executives/ 
Federal Courts    
77 (31)  100% 9,4% 9,4% 
Total 2915 (1367)  84,3% 6,6%  
4th convocation      
United Russia  2343 (615) 93,8% 95,1% 16,1%  
KPRF 477 (121) 46,3% 41,8% 37,6% 25,6% 
LDPR 161 (45) 6,3% 94,1% 81% 81% 
Rodina/A Just Russia 602 (115) 18,4% 52,9% 54,7% 31,8% 
RNVS 50 (7) 42,8% 68,8% 62,6% 31,4% 
Independents 380 (83) 18,6% 57,4% 42,2% 15,3% 
Government 51 (43)  96,1% 19,6% 19,6% 
Upper House 443 (118)  94,4% 20,3% 20,3% 
Regional Executives/ 
Federal Courts 
453 (75)  97,8% 3,5% 3,5% 
Total 4154 (975)  84,5% 12,8%  
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unsurprising and trivial. Note, however, that these results do seem to suggest that legislators 
are in the position to change government policy. In addition, although the percentages of 
passing amendments sponsored by the Duma’s ‘opposition’ parties in Table 1 are not 
negligible either, they are often much lower – suggesting that party membership of sponsors is 
an important division along which parliamentary majorities are built. Interestingly, there 
seems to be enormous variation across different parties in terms of the support they offer to 
their own members’ amendments – ranging from 98,5% of United Russia during the sixth 
convocation to 6,3% of the LDPR during the fourth convocation. This is a clear indication 
that legislators can effectively use their party groups to mobilize support for their policy 
demands in some parties more than in others.  
 The descriptive statistics in Table 1 are, however, insufficient to draw conclusions 
about the effect that party membership of sponsors has on the voting patterns in the Duma. 
For instance, a number of amendments sponsored by legislators of the three opposition parties 
might pass parliament because they are co-sponsored by legislators from United Russia. In 
order to estimate the effects of party membership of sponsors on the support they receive for 
their amendments, it is necessary to specify a model in which the independent variables are 
free to vary independently from each other while simultaneously controlling for each other’s 
effects. For this purpose, a number of multivariate fractional logit regression models has been 
specified (Table 2). Each model that is reported includes a number of control variables (i.e. 
(co)-sponsorship by non-partisan institutions and support by parties that are not represented 
by sponsors to an amendment) to avoid a selection bias that might exist when observations 
contain only amendments introduced by legislators and when voting patterns of non-
sponsoring parties is not controlled for. Because the main interest of this research is confined 
to the effects that political party groups have on the influence of legislators, however, the 
effects of control variables are not discussed in detail.  
The first hypothesis finds moderate support in the data. Table 2 shows that at least a 
number of political parties vote more often in favor of the amendments sponsored by their 
own members than those sponsored by legislators of other parties. Concerning the models that 
are specified to predict voting by United Russia, coefficients of party-predictors are mostly 
significant and often with the expected signs (i.e. a positive sign for its own predictor and 
negative for other party-predictors). To control for the possibility that the United Russia vote 
is not a party-vote but rather part of general cross-party support for United Russia legislators, 
the control variable ‘support by other parties’ is included in the analysis. Although this is a 
significant predictor, the effects of the party-predictors are as expected by the first hypothesis.  
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Fractional logit regression models (Ramalho et al. 2011). Each column reports three models (one per Duma 
convocation). For each predictor, the upper row displays results from models predicting the dependent variable 
in the sixth Duma convocation (2011-2016). Rows in the middle represent results from the fifth convocation 
(2007-2011). The lower rows contain results about the fourth convocation (2003-2007). Sig.: ***= p <.001, ** 
= p <.01, *= p <.05  
Table 2. Parliamentary support for amendments 
 Support for amendments per party (SE)  
 
Support by 
other parties 
  United Russia KPRF LDPR A Just Russia/ 
Rodina 
RNVS Independents 
Constant -6.60** (1.03) -3.45*** (.27) -3.23*** (.24) -.59*** (.16)   -.38*** (.09) 
 -3.46*** (.31) .09 (.29) -1.73*** (.56) .31* (.19)   .90*** (.23) 
 -2.29*** (.43) -.20 (.36) -2.41*** (.81) -1.84*** (.33) -1.23** (.22) -1.62* (.19) .32** (.13) 
United Russia 10.28** (1.20) 1.92*** (.23) 1.62*** (.21) -1.32*** (.18)   -.61*** (.09) 
 6.04*** (.41) -1.57*** (.27) -1.52*** (.55) -1.06*** (.18)   -2.58*** (.22) 
 4.83*** (.53) -2.52*** (.48) -1.13 (.78) -.73** (.37) .38* (.21) -.58*** (.20) -2.70*** (.17) 
KPRF -.35 (.35) 1.03*** (.22) .91*** (.19) -.25** (.11)   .13 (.09) 
 -.98*** (.99) .48* (.29) -.93*(.48) .02 (.16)   -1.62*** (.13) 
 -1.69*** (.31) 1.36*** (.21) -.83 (.69) .49** (.23) 1.20*** (.20) -.12 (.13) -1.02*** (.19) 
LDPR -.06 (.26) .63** (.26) .12 (.27) -.09 (.23)   .60*** (.13) 
 .35 (.60) -.72** (.29) .84 (.62) .77*** (.27)   -.62 (.43) 
 1.18** (.56) -.62* (.37) 1.08 (.82) -.05 (.37) -.20 (.20) -.13 (.13) .06 (.25) 
A Just Russia/ -1.63*** (.27) 1.65*** (.26) 1.48*** (.22) .89*** (.14)   -.36*** (.10) 
  Rodina -.49* (.27) -1.03*** (.26) -1.17*** (.42) .57*** (.14)   -.73*** (.23) 
 -1.88*** (.43) -.09 (.41) -1.34 (.90) .42 (.27) .24 (.20) .42*** (.14) -.52** (.20) 
RNVS 3.27*** (.89) -1.22*** (.38) .76 (.64) -.05 (1.01) -.14 (.62) -.68* (.41) -.01 (.31) 
Independents -.45* (.27) .23 (.23) .06 (.68) -.22 (.26) -.21 (.19) .41*** (.11) -.53*** (.18) 
        
Government .66* (.38) .21 (.27) .68** (.27) -2.64*** (.16)   .84*** (.10) 
 1.50*** (.36) -7.02*** (.64) 1.06*** (.37) -.62*** (.20)   .02 (.23) 
 .27 (.74) .31 (.38) -1.83*** (.59) -1.99*** (.34) -1.24** (.29) .28* (.14) .44*** (.15) 
Upper House -.02 (.41) .39** (.17) .64*** (.16) -1.15*** (.23)   .95*** (.10) 
 .88** (.36) -2.24*** (.31) -2.03** (.93) .08 (.25)   .03 (.23) 
 .06 (.37) -.62* (.37) -.73 (.54) -.10 (.22) -.44*** (.16) .04 (.11) .40*** (.12) 
Regional  1.33** (.60) -1.70*** (.28) -0.00 (.21) -.62** (.26)   .58*** (.10) 
  Executives/ 2.34*** (.33) -18.14** (.31) -15.39** (.39) -15.86** (.23)   -.14 (.23) 
  Federal Courts .14 (.40) -.45 (.65) -.79 (.76) -.83 (.69) -.13 (.24) -.23 (.28) .46*** (.15) 
Committee bill -1.48*** (.35) -.44*** (.15) -.28* (.15) .73*** (.23)   -.18 (.13) 
 .54** (.24) .62*** (.15) -.58 (.43) -1.46*** (.21)   .25** (.11) 
 -.09 (.49) .22 (.40) -1.01*** (.36) .95*** (.21) .62*** (.15) -.05 (.14) .22 (.15) 
Support by  17.38** (2.23) 3.58*** (.21) 2.97** (.21) -.41* (.24)    
  other  parties 8.76*** (.62) 1.81*** (.28) -1.28*** (.48) -2.25*** (.23)    
 8.67*** (1.03)  -.65 (.83) -.11 (.53) 1.43*** (.33) -.85*** (.34)  
        
Pseudo-R² .95 .26 .07 .26   .24 
 .93 .34 .06 .26   .47 
 .75 .32 .05 .08 .13 .03 .58 
N 2021 2021 2021 2021   2021 
 1367 1367 1367 1367   1367 
 975 975 975 975 866 975 975 
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The first differences of the predicted probabilities (Table 3), calculated with the coefficients 
from the fractional logit models, show as well that United Russia’s support for amendments is  
by far stronger when its own members sponsor an amendment than when the amendment is 
not sponsored by United Russia legislators. This conclusion holds for all three Duma 
convocations under analysis. Interestingly, there is little variation across different policy areas, 
as indicated by low cross-committee variance in (unreported) multilevel models. 
The first hypothesis holds less strongly when analyzing the Duma’s ‘opposition’ 
parties. Concerning the KPRF, the data clearly show that the Communist Party has become 
less opposed to the ‘party of power’ over the most recent years.11 The models that predict 
voting by the KPRF show an interesting shift in the most recent Duma convocation from very 
negative towards United Russia to very positive. Regarding support for legislators from other 
parties, however, the KPRF is much more supportive of its own legislators than of those from 
other parties. Consequentially, then, the first hypothesis finds support from the KPRF-models 
mostly in the data on the fourth and fifth Duma convocations. Control has been taken for the 
support that other parties offer to KPRF-legislators and the variation that might exist across 
standing committees. Although voting patterns of other parties correlate with KPRF-voting 
and small differences exist across policy areas in the fourth Duma convocation, the effects of 
party-predictors are significant and more often than not as expected. The predicted 
probabilities in Table 3 suggest that support by the KPRF for its own legislators has always 
been strong and significant, albeit that support for legislators from United Russia and A Just 
Russia in the sixth Duma convocation is strong and significant too.  
Conclusions concerning the first hypothesis are somewhat mixed as well in the case of 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democrats. The LDPR significantly opposed amendments by other 
parties throughout the fourth and the fifth Duma convocations (albeit more significantly in the 
fifth than during the fourth), whereas more recently the party has become to support MPs 
from other parties much stronger and more significant than its own MPs. Support for the 
party’s own legislators has always been positive but weak and/or insignificant (Table 3). It’s 
not impossible, however, that the lack of effect is partly due to the low frequency by which 
MPs from the LDPR introduce  amendments. Given the negative effects of support by other 
parties, however, it’s is unlikely that the weak effects are caused by a strong overlap between 
voting by the LDPR and other parties. In addition, low cross-committee variance in 
unreported multilevel models show there is few variation across policy area. Lack of support  
                                                          
11
 For an in-depth analysis of the Duma’s opposition in recent years, see March 2012. 
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For fractional regression models, first differences in predicted probabilities indicate the percentage points by 
which the response variables change when the independent variable of interest is changed from its minimum to 
its maximum value, while other variables are held constant. Significance signs are repeated from Table 2 and 
shown between brackets. Sig.: ***= p <.001, ** = p <.01, *= p <.0.5 
for the first hypothesis in the models that predict voting by the LDPR, therefore, indicates that 
it is not a party through which members successfully mobilize support among party members. 
The first hypothesis finds relatively strong support in the models that predict voting by 
A Just Russia. Surprisingly for a party that has its origins as a Kremlin-party, A Just Russia 
has always been a significant opponent of United Russia – change over time in first 
differences of predicted probabilities (Table 3) shows that opposition to United Russia by A 
Just Russia has even increased. The party seems to be, moreover, ambiguous towards the 
KPRF and the LDPR, but unequivocally supportive of the amendments introduced by its own 
legislators since 2007. The effects are somewhat mixed, however, across different policy 
Table 3. Effect size of fractional regression coefficients 
 Support for amendments per party (First differences in percentage points) Support by 
other parties  United Russia KPRF LDPR A Just Russia/ 
Rodina 
RNVS Independents  
United Russia            75.9% (**) 83.8% (***) 82.2% (***) -32.0% (***) - - -39.2% (***) 
 45.4% (***) -36.3% (***) -3.8% (***) -23.2% (***) - - -61.6% (***) 
 58.1% (***) -29.3% (***) -3.8% -14.8% (**) 65.9% (*) -14.2% (***) -55.8% (***) 
KPRF                         -14.3% 71.4% (***) 69.9% (***) -14.0% (**) - - 14.6% 
 -92.0% (***) 64.4% (*) -2.3% (*) 2.1% - - -40.8% (***) 
 -94.9% (***) 93.4% (***) -2.1% 90.2% (**) 64.2% (***) -8.7% -20.7% (***) 
LDPR                        -1.4% 60.1% (**) 13.1% -6.5% - - 54.1% (***) 
 -4.8% -22.2% (**) 79.7% 80.7% (***) - - -33.2% 
 6.5% (**) -7.9% (*) 98.1% -5.4% -36.7% -8.8% 19.5% 
A Just Russia/            -95.6% (***) 79.0% (***) 78.4% (***) 75.7% (***) - - -28.8% (***) 
  Rodina                        -50.1% (*) -26.1% (***) -2.5% (***) 72.3% (***) - - -36.9% (***) 
 -94.9% (***) -5.8% -2.2% 89.2% 58.1% 88.9% (***) -19.7% (**) 
RNVS                         6.3% (***) -7.8% (***) 98.1% -4.8% -32.4% -10.3% (*) -2.1% 
Independents              -92.8% (*) 67.8% 3.1% -9.7% -37.4% 88.6% (***) -19.4% (***) 
        
Government              4.3% (*) 23.4% 62.1% (**) -24.0% (***) - - 60.4% (***) 
 6.2% (***) -37.0% (***) 92.7% (***) -16.4% (***) - - 2.3% 
 6.1% 83.4% -2.1% (***) -10.7% (***) -40.6% (**) 79.6% (*) 81.2% (***) 
Upper House             -0.3% 43.2% (**) 60.7% (***) -23.3% (***) - - 62.7% (***) 
 5.8% (**) -26.1% (***) -2.4% (**) 8.2% - - 4.6% 
 3.6% -8.3% (*) -2.1% -7.8% -40.5% (***) 7.5%  81.2% (***) 
Regional  4.8% (**) -32.4% (***) -0.3% -20.7% (**) - - 53.3% (***) 
   Executive/                  5.6% (***) -29.9% (**) -2.8% (**) -21.4% (**) - - -16.8% 
   Federal Courts    5.5% -8.0% -2.0% -10.5% -31.6%  -10.1% 81.5% (***) 
Committee bill          -93.9% (***) -25.5% (***) -19.5% (*) 68.6% (***) - - -17.1% 
 5.8% (**) 73.4% (***) -2.2% -21.1% (***) - - 37.7% (***) 
 -15.6% 65.0% -2.3% (***) 91.7% (***) 63.8% (***) -5.2% 69.4% 
Support by  94.7% (**) 89.0% (***) -87.0% (**) -19.5% (*) - - - 
other parties 65.2% (***) 87.9% (***) -3.3% (***) -31.8% (***) - - - 
 40.8% (***) -15.5% (***) -2.2% -8.2% 69.5% (***) -12.6% (***) - 
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areas. The fact that the first differences in predicted probabilities are generally highest for 
amendments that were introduced by the party’s own members shows that A Just Russia is a 
significant and strong supporter of its own members, more than of legislators from other 
parties. Concerning the bloc that emerged when a number of Rodina-MPs did not merge into 
A Just Russia, the RNVS-bloc predictor generates inconsistent results, which might, however, 
be caused by the very low number of amendments its members have introduced (Table 1).  
Regarding and in accordance with the second hypothesis, independent legislators in 
the fourth Duma convocation receive no (significant) support from other legislators. 
Moreover, the predictor variables measuring the effect of independent deputies on United 
Russia and A Just Russia  display a significantly negative effect. Slightly more than half of 
the amendments sponsored by independent deputies pass a parliamentary majority (Table 1), 
but the voting patterns are too weak to conclude that parties have generally supported the 
amendments of their independent colleagues. The adoption of legislation sponsored by 
independents might, to some extent, have been caused by co-sponsorship with legislators 
from parliamentary parties. The fact that independents are less able to mobilize collective 
action among other legislators than partisan legislators shows that party membership is an 
important institutional asset for legislators in the Duma to mobilize collective action.  
Finally, the current analysis finds no support for the third hypothesis, according to 
which parties are more likely to support the amendments of legislators who come from other 
parties that are closely related to the executive than those who come from parties that are less 
loyalist. When the variable that measures support by parties other than the parties to which 
sponsors belong is regressed on the party-predictors, coefficients are consistently negative 
and/or insignificant. This indicates that cross-party support is generally weak in the Duma. In 
combination with the discussion of the first and second hypothesis, the lack of cross-party 
support shows that parliamentary parties are institutions of the utmost importance in the 
Duma. Given United Russia’s absolute majority over the course of the three Duma 
convocations under analysis, this indicates that legislators from parties other than United 
Russia have significantly less influence on policies by the government than United Russia-
members because of United Russia’s significant and strong support for the amendments of its 
own legislators and opposition to those of MPs from other parties. 
 
Conclusion 
Legislatures in authoritarian regimes are traditionally believed to be little more than 
subservient rubber stamps of government policies that, importantly, do not constitute an 
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institutionalized channel through which influence on government policies can be exerted. 
Over the last decade, however, literature on authoritarian politics has experienced significant 
growth through cross-fertilization with arguments from general neo-institutionalist literature. 
As a result, institutions in authoritarian systems are no longer considered meaningless 
structures without their own independent functional logic. The bulk of this literature, however, 
retains an exclusive focus on the leader’s perspective in which institutions (including 
parliaments and parties) serve the purpose of regime longevity. The generally undiscussed 
assumption that underlies this logic is that these institutions provide second-order elites with 
significant gains they would lack in the absence of these very institutions. This paper has 
adopted a novel approach and shows that individual legislators in authoritarian regimes can 
have influence on government policy through party groups in legislatures. 
Based on the neo-institutionalist argument that political parties invest individual 
politicians with an incentive to remain loyal and obedient in exchange for influence on policy 
(Aldrich 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), this paper shows that subservience indeed does 
not necessarily entail an absence of influence. The discussion of the data on legislative 
behavior of Russian MPs shows that legislators are often in the position to adjust government 
policy by securing support from their own party colleagues. This conclusion holds especially 
for the main party of interest in Russia, United Russia, which has controlled an absolute 
majority in the Duma for more than a decade. In substantive terms this implies that influence 
is mostly confined to an exclusive group of legislators who, given the exclusive and selective 
distribution of influence, have reasons to remain party loyalists if their desire is to retain their 
privileged position. 
The results of this research clearly show that a complete understanding of authoritarian 
politics must be based on an analysis of policy-making that is more nuanced than the 
traditional view of personalist dictatorships. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this paper 
shows that a large number of privileged individual legislators in Russia are co-opted into an 
authoritarian leader’s ‘long winning coalition’ through empowerment in their parliamentary 
party. In spite of these conclusions, however, a number of caveats still need to be addressed. 
First, although the hypotheses of this research are supported by the data, conclusions are 
insufficiently robust to close the discussion. Results seem to vary across different parties and 
periods, which indicates that there is a need for further explanation. Analyzing the causal 
effects of ideology, intra-party institutions and/or the divergence of policy preferences among 
party members on the ability of party groups to provide collective action in favor of their 
individual members is suggested as a path for further research. Secondly, the general 
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assumption behind the analysis has been that preferences of legislators exist independently 
from the context in which they are embedded. Legislators of ‘opposition’ parties run few risks 
of showing disloyalty by voting against proposals by the government or United Russia 
because the latter’s decisions are both necessary and sufficient. The current analysis is unable 
to predict what might happen when the ‘opposition’ parties obtain a veto-position in future 
Duma convocations. More generally, however, this paper unequivocally shows that 
parliamentary institutions in authoritarian regimes are much more important than what is 
usually assumed and that further research into the organizational and ideological 
characteristics of parliamentary parties is necessary to empirically discern the causal 
mechanisms behind empowerment of legislators in authoritarian regimes. 
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